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ASIC RG 71
ASIC RG 71 — ASIC Regulatory Guide – RG 71 Downstream acquisitions
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REGULATORY GUIDE 71
Downstream acquisitions
August 2016
About this guide
This guide is for companies, listed managed investment schemes, investors
and their advisers who are involved in, or affected by, downstream
acquisitions.
In some circumstances, a downstream acquisition may breach s606 of the
Corporations Act.
This guide explains:
the downstream acquisition exemption in item 14 of s611 (item 14);
when we may grant relief;
the conditions that may apply to our relief; and
how to apply for relief.
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About ASIC regulatory documents
In administering legislation ASIC issues the following types of regulatory
documents.
Consultation papers: seek feedback from stakeholders on matters ASIC
is considering, such as proposed relief or proposed regulatory guidance.
Regulatory guides: give guidance to regulated entities by:
explaining when and how ASIC will exercise specific powers under
legislation (primarily the Corporations Act)
explaining how ASIC interprets the law
describing the principles underlying ASIC’s approach
giving practical guidance (e.g. describing the steps of a process such
as applying for a licence or giving practical examples of how
regulated entities may decide to meet their obligations).
Information sheets: provide concise guidance on a specific process or
compliance issue or an overview of detailed guidance.
Reports: describe ASIC compliance or relief activity or the results of a
research project.
Document history
This guide was issued in August 2016 and is based on legislation and
regulations as at the date of issue. On 27 July 2020, we updated the process
for submitting an application for relief in RG 71.89. In June 2026, we
updated this guide with references to remade legislative instruments.
Previous versions:
Superseded Regulatory Guide 71, issued May 2012
Superseded Policy Statement 71, issued 15 November 1993, reissued
1 July 1996, rebadged as a regulatory guide 5 July 2007
Disclaimer
This guide does not constitute legal advice. We encourage you to seek your
own professional advice to find out how the Corporations Act and other
applicable laws apply to you, as it is your responsibility to determine your
obligations.
Examples in this guide are purely for illustration; they are not exhaustive and
are not intended to impose or imply particular rules or requirements.
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Contents
A Overview ........................................................................................... 4
What is a downstream acquisition? ................................................... 4
Purposes of Ch 6 ............................................................................... 5
The exemption in item 14 .................................................................. 6
When ASIC may grant relief .............................................................. 6
Conditions of relief that may apply .................................................... 6
Applying for relief ............................................................................... 6
B The exemption in item 14 ................................................................ 7
The exemption in item 14 .................................................................. 7
Our approach to the exemption ......................................................... 8
Scope of the exemption ..................................................................... 8
C When ASIC may grant relief.......................................................... 11
Our approach to relief applications .................................................. 11
When we may grant relief ................................................................ 12
Key concepts relevant to our decision about relief and conditions.. 13
When we will not grant relief ............................................................ 15
D Conditions of relief ........................................................................ 16
What conditions may apply? ............................................................ 16
Downstream bid condition ............................................................... 17
Standstill and voting conditions ....................................................... 22
Other conditions that may apply ...................................................... 24
E Applying for relief .......................................................................... 25
How to apply for relief ...................................................................... 25
Information applicants should provide ............................................. 25
Procedural fairness .......................................................................... 26
Approving a foreign exchange ......................................................... 27
Key terms ............................................................................................... 28
Related information ............................................................................... 30
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A Overview
Key points
A person may acquire a relevant interest in the shares of a downstream
company as a result of an acquisition of a relevant interest in an upstream
entity.
This guide explains:
• downstream acquisitions and when a person may breach s606 as a
result of an upstream acquisition (see RG 71.1–RG 71.4);
• the exemption for downstream acquisitions in item 14 of s611 (item 14),
our approach to the exemption, the scope of the exemption, and when
we may apply to the Takeovers Panel for a declaration of unacceptable
circumstances even though the exemption in item 14 is satisfied (see
Section B);
• when we may grant relief to allow downstream acquisitions that would
breach s606 because they do not satisfy the exemption in item 14 (see
Section C);
• the conditions that may apply to our relief (see Section D); and
• how to apply for relief (see Section E).
What is a downstream acquisition?
RG 71.1 A downstream acquisition occurs when a person acquires a relevant interest
in the shares of a downstream company as a result of an acquisition in an
upstream entity (downstream acquisition).
RG 71.2 This is because a person is deemed under s608(3) of the Corporations Act
2001 (Corporations Act) to have the same relevant interests in securities that
an upstream entity has if they have voting power above 20% in, or control,
the entity.
Note: For ease of reference, we have generally used the term ‘company’ and ‘shares’
when referring to the downstream company because this is consistent with the language
adopted in Ch 6 of the Corporations Act. However, Ch 6 and this guide also apply to the
acquisition of relevant interests in voting securities of listed bodies and voting interests
of listed managed investment schemes: s603 and 604. In relation to the upstream
company, body or scheme, Ch 6 uses the terms ‘listed company’ and ‘body corporate’.
For ease of reference, we have used the term ‘upstream entity’ throughout this guide.
RG 71.3 The downstream acquisition will breach s606 in circumstances where the
relevant interest in the downstream company exceeds the thresholds in s606,
unless an exemption in s611 applies. Item 14 of s611 (item 14) provides an
exemption for certain downstream acquisitions.
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RG 71.4 Two examples of downstream acquisitions that may breach the thresholds in
s606 are set out below.
Example 1: Acquiring a relevant interest in an upstream entity
Company A acquires a relevant interest in 40% of the securities in Entity B
where Entity B has a relevant interest in 25% of the shares in Company C.
This will result in Company A acquiring a relevant interest in 25% of the
shares in Company C (by the application of s608(3)(a)).
Example 2: Acquiring control of an upstream managed investment
scheme
Company A acquires control of Scheme 1 where Scheme 1 has a relevant
interest in 25% of the interests in Scheme 2 (a listed managed investment
scheme). This will result in Company A acquiring a relevant interest in 25%
of the interests in Scheme 2 (by application of s608(3)(b)).
Note: It is assumed in each example that Company A did not have an existing relevant
interest in the shares in Company C or in the interests in Scheme 2.
Purposes of Ch 6
RG 71.5 The purposes of Ch 6 as set out in s602 are relevant to downstream
acquisitions. This is because a downstream acquisition may result in:
(a) an upstream acquirer obtaining control over a substantial interest in
the downstream company without downstream shareholders being
given an opportunity to consider the proposal, contrary to the principle
in s602(b); or
(b) the downstream holders not being given an equal opportunity to share
in any premium for control of the downstream shares that is reflected
in the price paid for the upstream acquisition, contrary to the principle
in s602(c).
RG 71.6 A downstream acquisition that satisfies the exemption in item 14 may
nonetheless give rise to unacceptable circumstances if the acquisition
offends the principles in s602. We will also consider the purposes of Ch 6
when considering whether to give relief to a downstream acquisition that
does not satisfy the exemption in item 14 and the conditions that should
apply to our relief.
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The exemption in item 14
RG 71.7 The exemption in item 14 applies where the upstream entity is included in
the official list of a declared financial market or a foreign body conducting a
financial market approved by us. In ASIC Corporations (Approved Foreign
Markets—Buy-backs and Takeovers) Instrument 2026/104, ASIC approves
each foreign body conducting an approved foreign market for the purposes
of item 14.
Note: In ASIC Instrument 2026/104, ‘approved foreign market’ has the same
meaning as in s5 of ASIC Corporations (Definition of Approved Foreign Market)
Instrument 2017/669.
RG 71.8 When considering whether a downstream acquisition is exempt from the
prohibition in s606, persons acquiring a relevant interest in an upstream entity
should be aware that there are limits to the scope of the exemption in item 14,
and a downstream acquisition may risk an application to the Takeovers Panel
for a declaration of unacceptable circumstances even though the exemption
applies. For a discussion of the downstream acquisition exemption in item 14
and the circumstances in which it should apply, see Section B.
When ASIC may grant relief
RG 71.9 ASIC has discretionary powers under s655A to grant relief from the
requirements of Ch 6. The circumstances where we may grant case-by-case
relief to permit a downstream acquisition that does not satisfy the exemption
in item 14 are discussed in Section C. We will continue to monitor
downstream acquisition transactions and consider new developments in this
area, as appropriate.
Conditions of relief that may apply
RG 71.10 The types of conditions that we may impose on any relief we grant will
depend on the circumstances of the downstream acquisition: see Section D.
Table 1 in Section D summarises when certain conditions will apply and
where to find more information on the conditions.
Applying for relief
RG 71.11 Applications for relief should be made before the upstream acquisition is
made. For details on how to apply for relief, see Section E.
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B The exemption in item 14
Key points
Item 14 provides an exemption from s606 for downstream acquisitions
where the upstream entity is listed on a declared financial market or on an
approved foreign financial market.
This section explains:
• the exemption in item 14 (see RG 71.12–RG 71.15);
• our approach to the exemption (see RG 71.16–RG 71.18); and
• the scope of the exemption, including when we may apply to the
Takeovers Panel for a declaration of unacceptable circumstances
(see RG 71.19–RG 71.24 and RG 71.26–RG 71.28).
The exemption in item 14
RG 71.12 Item 14 exempts a downstream acquisition from breaching s606 where the
acquisition results from an upstream acquisition of a relevant interest in
voting shares of a body corporate that is included in the official list of:
(a) a declared financial market; or
(b) a foreign body conducting a financial market that is a body approved in
writing by us.
RG 71.13 The exemption in item 14 was introduced following a period of uncertainty
in the law and recommendations by the Legal Committee of the Companies
and Securities Advisory Committee (CASAC) in its paper Anomalies in the
takeovers provisions of the Corporations Law (March 1994).
RG 71.14 We have approved a list of foreign financial markets for the purposes of
item 14: see ASIC Instrument 2026/104 and ASIC Instrument 2017/669.
Note: For the purposes of ASIC Instrument 2026/104, approved foreign market has the
same meaning as in ASIC Instrument 2017/669.
RG 71.15 In approving the list of foreign financial markets, we took into account the
criteria set out in Regulatory Guide 72 Foreign securities: Disclosure relief
(RG 72) at RG 72.59 because we consider that the extension of the item 14
exemption to foreign exchanges that meet these criteria satisfies the policy
behind the exemption in item 14: see RG 71.17. For a discussion of when we
may approve a new foreign market for the purposes of item 14, see
RG 71.96–RG 71.98.
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Our approach to the exemption
RG 71.16 Our approach to the exemption for downstream acquisitions in item 14 is to
uphold the policy behind the exemption while also taking into account the
investor protections afforded to downstream shareholders in s602.
RG 71.17 The policy behind the exemption in item 14 is designed to:
(a) preserve the free flow of shares in widely held entities listed on
appropriate exchanges;
(b) prevent companies constructing a takeover defence through the
acquisition of strategic parcels in downstream companies; and
(c) enhance international comity through the removal of obstacles to
primarily foreign business transactions.
Note: See the Legal Committee of CASAC, Anomalies in the takeovers provisions of
the Corporations Law (March 1994) at pp. 30–32 and the Explanatory Memorandum,
Corporations Bill 1988, cl 1966.
RG 71.18 International comity considerations underpin the extension of the exemption
in item 14 to downstream acquisitions occurring as a result of an acquisition
in a foreign entity listed on an approved foreign financial market. This is
because Australian securities regulation should not impose excessive costs or
regulatory obstacles on primarily foreign corporate transactions.
Scope of the exemption
RG 71.19 When considering whether a downstream acquisition is exempt from the
prohibition in s606, persons acquiring a relevant interest in an upstream
entity should be aware that:
(a) the upstream entity must have a primary listing (and not only a
secondary listing) on a declared financial market or an approved foreign
financial market;
(b) we will not consider that a downstream acquisition should be exempt
from s606 merely because another exemption in s611 may apply to the
upstream acquisition; and
(c) a downstream acquisition may risk an application to the Takeovers
Panel for a declaration of unacceptable circumstances even if it satisfies
the exemption in item 14.
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Secondary listings
RG 71.20 The exemption in item 14 excludes secondary listings. This is because the
place of incorporation and the listing rules of the exchange on which the
upstream entity has its primary listing may not satisfy the policy behind the
exemption in item 14. This means that the item 14 exemption will not apply
if the upstream entity only has a secondary listing on a declared financial
market or on an approved foreign financial market.
RG 71.21 Where a person makes an upstream acquisition and the upstream entity has
only a secondary listing on a declared financial market or an approved
foreign financial market, the acquirer may apply to us for individual
downstream acquisition relief: see Section C.
Upstream acquisitions where another exemption in s611
applies
RG 71.22 We may not consider that a downstream acquisition should be exempt from
s606 merely because another exemption in s611 applies to the upstream
acquisition.
RG 71.23 Downstream acquisitions will most often arise when a person makes a
takeover offer for an upstream entity. There is an exemption from s606 for
acquisitions that result from the acceptance of a takeover offer made under
Ch 6: see item 1 of s611.
RG 71.24 We do not consider that a downstream acquisition will be exempt from the
prohibition in s606 merely because an exemption in s611 other than item 14
applies to the upstream acquisition. This is because there is a separate
express exemption for downstream acquisitions in item 14. However, we
acknowledge that there are different views on this issue.
RG 71.25 An acquirer who cannot rely on item 14 but seeks to rely on another
exemption in s611 in relation to a downstream acquisition may risk regulatory
action by us, including an application to the Takeovers Panel for a declaration
of unacceptable circumstances.
Unacceptable circumstances
RG 71.26 A downstream acquisition may give rise to unacceptable circumstances even
if it satisfies the exemption in item 14. An application to the Takeovers
Panel for a declaration of unacceptable circumstances and orders (which
include remedial orders) in relation to the affairs of a company can be made
by ASIC or any other interested person: see Pt 6.10, Div 2, Subdiv B.
RG 71.27 Whether the circumstances of a downstream acquisition are unacceptable
will depend on the particulars of each case. However, the Takeovers Panel
will have regard to the purposes of Ch 6 set out in s602 when considering an
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application for a declaration of unacceptable circumstances. The Takeovers
Panel stated in Australian Pipeline Trust 01R [2006] ATP 29 at [106] that:
… there is clear indication in the explanatory memoranda and the relevant
extrinsic material (for the Corporations Act and its preceding legislation)
that the legislature was concerned that the exemption set out in Item 14 not
be abused and the intent of Chapter 6 not be avoided.
RG 71.28 The types of circumstances in which we may consider applying to the
Takeovers Panel for a declaration of unacceptable circumstances despite the
exemption in item 14 applying include where:
(a) control of the downstream company is a significant purpose of the
upstream acquisition (see, for example, the discussion in Leighton
Holdings Limited 02R [2010] ATP 14 at 67 and 70–86, and Leighton
Holdings 01, 02, 03 [2010] ATP 13 at 55); and/or
Note: If the downstream shares comprise over 50% of the assets of the upstream entity, the
Takeovers Panel will consider if (among other factors) reliance on item 14 is unacceptable
in the circumstances: see the discussion in Leighton Holdings Limited 02R [2010] ATP 14.
(b) the downstream acquisition technically satisfies the exemption in item 14
but subverts or otherwise does not meet the policy basis for reliance on
the exemption in item 14, such as where the upstream entity is listed in
name only and is closely held (see Cape Lambert Minsec Pty Ltd [2009]
ATP 12 at 40).
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C When ASIC may grant relief
Key points
Relief will be required where a downstream acquisition does not satisfy the
exemption in item 14.
This section explains:
• our approach to relief (see RG 71.29–RG 71.33);
• when we may grant relief (see RG 71.34–RG 71.36);
• key concepts relevant to our decision whether to grant relief (see
RG 71.37–RG 71.47); and
• when we will not grant relief (see RG 71.48).
Our approach to relief applications
RG 71.29 A person may apply for relief to make a downstream acquisition that would
otherwise result in the person breaching s606. This will be required if the
upstream entity is unlisted or does not have a primary listing on a declared
financial market or on an approved foreign financial market.
RG 71.30 In deciding whether to grant relief for a downstream acquisition that does
not satisfy the exemption in item 14, we will consider:
(a) the policy objectives of the exemption in item 14 (see RG 71.16–
RG 71.18); and
(b) the purposes of Ch 6, as set out in s602 (see RG 71.5–RG 71.6).
RG 71.31 A prerequisite to relief will be compliance by the party applying for relief
with the disclosure obligations discussed below.
Disclosure obligations
RG 71.32 Before we grant relief for a downstream acquisition that does not satisfy
item 14, the applicant must satisfy us that the market for the shares in the
downstream company is adequately informed about the upstream acquisition.
RG 71.33 We will not grant relief unless the acquirer of the upstream entity discloses
to the downstream company details about the timing and terms of the
upstream acquisition at the time the upstream acquisition is announced. If
the downstream company is listed, this will enable the downstream company
to make an announcement to the relevant financial market about the
upstream acquisition and the implications for the downstream shareholders.
If the downstream company is not listed, the provision of this information
will enable the downstream company to communicate directly with its
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members about the upstream acquisition and the potential implications of the
upstream acquisition on the downstream company.
When we may grant relief
RG 71.34 We may grant relief subject to conditions appropriate to the circumstances if
we are satisfied that the policy and investor protections identified in this
guide will be upheld.
RG 71.35 We will consider the following factors when deciding whether to grant relief:
(a) whether the upstream entity is listed or unlisted. We will be more likely
to grant relief if the upstream entity is listed;
(b) international comity considerations;
(c) whether control of the downstream company appears to be a significant
purpose of the upstream acquisition or whether the downstream shares
are a substantial part of the upstream entity’s assets;
Note: If we grant relief despite these factors being present, we would be likely to
impose a downstream bid condition to ensure that the principles in s602 will be upheld.
(d) the alternatives that are available to the acquirer. There may be other
ways to structure a transaction so that relief is not required, such as
where the downstream shares can be simply and efficiently separated
from the other assets of the upstream entity. In these circumstances, we
may refuse relief as unnecessary. However, we understand that
negotiations to separate the downstream shares from the assets of an
upstream entity may be impracticable in the circumstances;
(e) whether the regulation that applies to the upstream acquisition achieves
similar regulatory outcomes to Australian takeovers regulation;
(f) whether the upstream entity is widely or closely held—for example:
(i) we will be unlikely to grant relief where the upstream entity is
unlisted and closely held or listed in name only and closely held; and
(ii) where the upstream entity is closely held, it may also be easier for
the acquirer to negotiate to separate the shares in the downstream
company from the other assets of the upstream entity and relief
would be unnecessary; and
(g) any other circumstances that we consider relevant to the particular case.
RG 71.36 We may grant relief without conditions in rare and exceptional
circumstances. The circumstances where we may grant relief without
conditions are where:
(a) we are in the process of approving the relevant financial market for the
purposes of item 14; or
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(b) the upstream entity has a secondary listing on a declared financial
market or approved foreign financial market, which in the
circumstances is effectively the primary regulation that applies to the
upstream entity.
Key concepts relevant to our decision about relief and conditions
RG 71.37 When deciding whether to grant relief and the conditions that may apply, the
following concepts are relevant:
(a) whether control of the downstream company may be regarded as a
significant purpose of the upstream acquisition (this is relevant to both
whether we will grant relief and the conditions that may apply);
(b) whether the downstream shares are a substantial part of the upstream
entity’s assets (this is relevant to both whether we will grant relief and
the conditions that may apply); and
(c) whether the acquirer will obtain effective control of the downstream
company as a result of the upstream acquisition (this is relevant to the
conditions that may apply).
RG 71.38 For a discussion of the conditions that may apply to our relief, see Section D.
For guidance on the information that should be provided to us when
applying for relief, see Section E.
Control purpose
RG 71.39 If there is a control purpose in relation to the downstream company, we may
refuse to grant relief, or grant relief subject to conditions that ensure that the
principles in s602 will be upheld (such as requiring that the acquirer make a
downstream bid).
RG 71.40 When assessing whether control of the downstream company may be
regarded as a significant purpose of the upstream acquisition, we will take
into account all the relevant circumstances. These will include whether the
circumstances suggest that the upstream acquisition has been structured or
designed to avoid complying with Ch 6 in relation to the downstream company.
RG 71.41 The following factors may suggest to us that control of the downstream
company is a significant purpose of the upstream acquisition:
(a) the percentage of shares in the downstream company held by the
upstream entity, including whether the shares comprise a substantial
part of the assets of the upstream entity;
(b) the voting power of the acquirer in the downstream company at the time
of the application, as well as the voting power of the acquirer following
the upstream acquisition;
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(c) the nature of the assets of the upstream entity, other than the shares in
the downstream company (i.e. whether they are highly liquid, or are
readily procurable or saleable commodities otherwise than through the
upstream acquisition);
(d) any association or aggregation of relevant interests or voting power
caused by the downstream acquisition; and
(e) cross-shareholdings, common board memberships and any other
common significant management or other relevant relationships
between any of the following:
(i) the acquirer;
(ii) the upstream entity;
(iii) the downstream company; or
(iv) their associates.
Substantial assets
RG 71.42 If the downstream shares comprise a substantial part of the assets of the
upstream entity, we may refuse relief or grant relief subject to conditions that
ensure that the principles in s602 will be upheld (such as requiring that the
acquirer make a downstream bid).
RG 71.43 We will normally regard 50% of the upstream entity’s assets as the threshold
for determining whether the downstream shares constitute ‘a substantial part
of the assets of the upstream entity’. If the market value of the downstream
shares constitutes more than 50% of the value of the assets of the upstream
entity, we will be more likely to determine that control of the downstream
company is a significant purpose of the upstream acquisition.
RG 71.44 While 50% or more of the assets of the upstream entity is the threshold for
determining whether the downstream shares constitute a substantial part of
the assets of the upstream entity, we may choose to lower this figure taking
into account the practical circumstances of the proposed acquisitions (e.g. if
the upstream entity has significant cash assets).
Effective control
RG 71.45 If the acquirer will obtain effective control of the downstream company as a
result of an upstream acquisition, any relief granted would generally be
subject to a condition that the acquirer make a downstream bid for the
downstream company.
RG 71.46 When determining whether the acquirer will obtain effective control of the
downstream company, we will generally regard voting power of 50% or
above as constituting effective control. This is because the acquirer will have
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absolute or effective control over the downstream company with control
over 50% or more of the voting shares.
RG 71.47 We may choose a figure lower than 50% if it appears to us that effective
control over the downstream company, such as is envisaged under s50AA or
the accounting standards dealing with controlling entities, may be exercised
with less than 50% of the voting shares in the downstream company. We
will also consider the circumstances of the downstream company, including
the share register and whether there are any other substantial shareholdings
in the downstream company.
When we will not grant relief
RG 71.48 We will not grant relief to facilitate a downstream acquisition where:
(a) relief would be inconsistent with the policy behind the exemption in
item 14 and the principles in s602; or
(b) after considering all the relevant circumstances, we are not satisfied that
the regulatory detriment is minimal or clearly outweighed by the
resulting commercial benefit: see Regulatory Guide 51 Applications for
relief (RG 51), in particular RG 51.57–RG 51.62; or
(c) the upstream acquisition is not legal in the jurisdiction where it is to
take place; or
(d) it appears to us that the downstream acquisition may give rise to
unacceptable circumstances.
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D Conditions of relief
Key points
This section explains the factors we will consider when determining the
types of conditions that may apply to our relief: see RG 71.49–RG 71.52.
The conditions that may apply to our relief are:
• a downstream bid condition (see RG 71.53–RG 71.72); or
• standstill and voting conditions (see RG 71.73–RG 71.81); and/or
• other conditions instead of, or in addition to, these conditions, including
a sell-down condition (see RG 71.82–RG 71.85).
What conditions may apply?
RG 71.49 Before we grant relief to allow a downstream acquisition that does not
satisfy item 14, the applicant must satisfy us that the market for the shares in
the downstream company will be adequately informed about the upstream
acquisition. This will generally require the applicant to comply with certain
disclosure obligations: see RG 71.32–RG 71.33.
RG 71.50 Where we grant relief to allow a downstream acquisition that does not
satisfy the exemption in item 14, our relief will be subject to:
(a) a downstream bid condition; or
(b) standstill and voting conditions; and/or
(c) other types of conditions (including a sell-down condition) instead of,
or in addition to, the above conditions on a case-by-case basis.
RG 71.51 When determining the conditions that should apply, we will consider:
(a) whether control of the downstream company may be regarded as a
significant purpose of the upstream acquisition (see RG 71.39–RG 71.41);
(b) whether the downstream shares represent a substantial part of the assets
of the upstream entity (see RG 71.42–RG 71.44);
(c) whether the downstream shares to be acquired through the upstream
acquisition will give the acquirer effective control of the downstream
company (see RG 71.45–RG 71.47);
(d) the effect of the acquisition on the other downstream shareholders;
(e) whether the conditions are practical in the circumstances; and
(f) any other circumstances that we consider relevant to the particular case.
Note: When calculating the downstream shares to which the upstream acquirer is
entitled to, or becomes entitled to following the downstream acquisition, we will
include the shares and interests in the downstream company referred to in RG 71.41.
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RG 71.52 Table 1 summarises the different types of conditions that may apply to
our relief.
Table 1: Conditions that may apply
Conditions When they may apply
Downstream bid condition
(see RG 71.53–RG 71.72)
This condition will generally apply when:
control of the downstream company appears to be a significant
purpose; or
downstream shares are a substantial part of the upstream entity’s
assets; or
effective control of the downstream company will be obtained.
Standstill and voting conditions
(see RG 71.73–RG 71.81)
These types of conditions will generally apply when:
control of the downstream company does not appear to be a
significant purpose;
downstream shares are not a substantial part of the upstream
entity’s assets; and
effective control of the downstream company will not be obtained.
Other types of conditions
(including a sell-down condition)
(see RG 71.82–RG 71.85)
We will apply other types of conditions on a case-by-case basis, as
appropriate. These conditions may be instead of, or in addition to, the
above conditions.
Downstream bid condition
RG 71.53 A downstream bid condition will require the acquirer to make a takeover bid
for the downstream company on terms consistent with the policy set out
below. The purpose of the downstream bid condition is to ensure that, as far
as is practicable, the downstream shareholders share equally in the benefits
being offered to the upstream holders under the upstream acquisition. Our
guidance on the terms of the downstream bid is based on the Federal Court
decision in BTR Plc v Westinghouse Brake and Signal Co (Australia) Ltd
(1992) 106 ALR 35.
RG 71.54 Where our relief is subject to a downstream bid condition, we may also
impose a voting condition that would generally prevent the acquirer from
being able to exercise, or procure the exercise of, the votes attached to the
downstream shares in excess of 20% until the close of the downstream bid.
This condition is to ensure fairness between the acquirer and the other
downstream shareholders during the downstream bid period.
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Type of bid
RG 71.55 A downstream bid must be an offer to acquire all (and not a specified
proportion) of the bid class securities that the acquirer does not otherwise
have a relevant interest in and that exist or will exist at the date specified in
the bidder’s statement lodged with ASIC.
Pricing of downstream bid
RG 71.56 We will normally require a downstream bid to be cash or include a cash
alternative that is not less than the fair value ascribed to the downstream
shares by an independent expert approved by us, or the ‘effective’ price.
‘Effective’ price
RG 71.57 If the price effectively being offered to the upstream shareholders for the
shares in the downstream company held by the upstream entity can be
clearly and accurately determined from the upstream acquisition price, we
will allow the downstream bid to be made at the ‘effective’ price (i.e. where
the upstream entity is a listed investment entity and the upstream acquisition
price does not indicate that the market price for each of the investments is
unreliable).
RG 71.58 We reserve the discretion in such cases to alter the pricing mechanism for
the downstream bid if later information indicates that the ‘effective’ price
paid for the downstream shares is not as transparent as represented to us in
the application. Any uncertainty about the price will be reduced if we have
the opportunity to obtain submissions from third parties who may be affected
by our decision before we alter the pricing mechanism for the downstream
bid. These submissions would be on the mechanism for determining the
price of the downstream bid.
RG 71.59 If the upstream acquisition price is ‘see-through’ and is increased during the
course of the upstream acquisition, the increase must be reflected in an
increase in the downstream bid price.
Independent expert’s valuation to determine fair value
RG 71.60 It will often not be possible to clearly and accurately determine the
‘effective’ price being offered for the downstream shares from the upstream
acquisition price. Where this is the case, we will generally require that the
consideration for the downstream bid must not be less than the fair value
ascribed to the shares in the downstream company as determined by an
independent expert approved by us.
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RG 71.61 In determining the fair value of shares in the downstream company:
(a) the independent expert should follow the guidance in Regulatory
Guide 111 Content of expert reports (RG 111);
(b) the independent expert must determine the value per share, inclusive of
a premium for control, regardless of percentage ownership of the
downstream company (because this valuation method, by definition,
distributes any control premium equally between all shareholders);
(c) the independent expert must determine the value per share on the basis of
information that was available to the acquirer at the time the acquirer was
fixing the price of the upstream acquisition (the independent expert is not
limited to information that was used by the acquirer);
(d) the acquirer must ensure that the independent expert is provided with all
information about the downstream company that was available to the
acquirer when the acquirer was fixing the price of the upstream acquisition;
(e) the independent expert report must include a prominent statement that:
(i) the purpose of the report is to set the price of the downstream bid
and has not been prepared for the purpose of providing an opinion
as to whether the downstream bid is fair and reasonable within the
meaning of s640; and
(ii) that the report has been prepared on the basis of information
available to the acquirer at the time the upstream acquisition price
was fixed and therefore will not take into account any new
circumstances that occur in relation to the downstream company,
which may affect the fair value of the downstream shares;
(f) the acquirer of the upstream entity must pay the independent expert’s
fees; and
(g) the independent expert report must be included in the acquirer’s
bidder’s statement for the downstream company.
RG 71.62 If the independent expert gives a range of values, calculated by one valuation
methodology, generally the price shall be the midpoint of the range. This is
because, where it is not possible to determine an ‘effective’ price, the independent
expert report serves the function of determining a fair value for the downstream
shares. If the independent expert gives different values or different midpoints
calculated by different methodologies, we consider that the highest value or
highest midpoint should be used. We may consider requests to vary the terms of
the relief for the selection of the downstream bid price and will consider the
independent expert’s advice in determining these applications.
RG 71.63 The independent expert must determine the fair value of the downstream
shares as at the time when the acquirer was fixing the price of the upstream
acquisition. If the price of the upstream acquisition is subsequently increased,
the expert must determine the fair value of the downstream shares at the time
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of the increase and prepare a revised independent expert report. If necessary,
the price of the downstream bid must be increased so that it is at least equal
to this new value.
RG 71.64 In this situation, we will generally require the preparation of a revised
independent expert report (which may be done by way of a supplementary
report), and the value of the downstream bid must not be less than the updated
fair value of the downstream shares as at the time when the acquirer was
fixing the increased price of the upstream acquisition.
RG 71.65 New circumstances may arise during the downstream bid period that could
have a material impact on the independent expert’s assessment of the fair
value of the downstream company’s shares. Where the price of the upstream
acquisition is not increased as a result of the new circumstances, we will not
require the downstream bid price to be increased because there is no increase
in the benefit being offered to the upstream shareholders. We consider that it
may be appropriate for the independent expert to make a statement as to the
status of the independent expert report in light of the new circumstances.
RG 71.66 The new circumstances may be information that downstream shareholders
and their professional advisers might reasonably require to make an
informed assessment whether to accept the downstream bid. Accordingly,
the directors of the downstream company will need to:
(a) consider whether to revise their recommendation in relation to the
downstream bid; and
(b) provide shareholders with a supplementary target’s statement
explaining the effect of the new circumstances and consider whether
valuation information should be provided where the new circumstances
affect whether the downstream bid price is fair or reasonable.
Other terms of downstream bid
RG 71.67 We will normally require a downstream bid to meet the following other
conditions:
(a) Duration: The legislature has determined that one month is the
minimum period to satisfy s602(b): see s624(1)(b). However, if an
acquirer makes its downstream bid before the upstream acquisition
becomes unconditional, the acquirer must ensure that its downstream bid
remains open long enough for shareholders to consider that bid in light of
significant events in the upstream acquisition. The downstream bid
should remain open for at least two weeks after the acquirer becomes
unconditionally entitled to more than 20% of the voting shares in the
upstream entity or the upstream acquisition becomes unconditional
(whichever is the later).
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(b) Dispatch: Offers must be dispatched no later than four weeks after the
acquirer becomes entitled to more than 20% of the voting shares in the
upstream entity or the upstream acquisition is declared unconditional
(whichever is the earlier).
Note: If an upstream offer is made in a foreign jurisdiction where the takeover threshold
is greater than 20%, we may increase the relevant references in this guide to 20% of the
voting shares in the upstream entity.
Permissible defeating conditions of downstream bid
RG 71.68 Our relief will normally limit the defeating conditions that the acquirer may
place on the downstream bid. However, provided that it undertakes in its
offer to use its best endeavours to satisfy them, our relief will generally
allow an acquirer to impose the following defeating conditions on its
downstream bid:
(a) the upstream acquisition is successful (providing that success is defined
as being unconditionally entitled to more than 20% of the voting shares
in the upstream entity);
(b) no prescribed occurrence occurs. The condition may relate to events
that occur from the date of the announcement of the upstream
acquisition, but must be worded to lapse once the acquirer has achieved
control of the downstream company via the upstream acquisition; and
(c) requisite regulatory approval is gained (e.g. from the Foreign
Investment Review Board or the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission).
RG 71.69 We will not allow a downstream bid to be subject to a defeating condition
for minimum acceptances or that the acquirer achieve the thresholds for
compulsory acquisition set out in s661A(1).
Note: In BTR Plc v Westinghouse Brake and Signal Co (Australia) Ltd (1992) 106 ALR
35, the Federal Court held that the predecessor of ASIC, the Australian Securities
Commission, was entitled to refuse to permit an acquirer to make a downstream bid
subject to a compulsory acquisition condition.
Related relief for downstream company: Expert report
under s640
RG 71.70 To satisfy s640, the downstream target may be required to provide an expert
report that states whether in the expert’s opinion, the takeover offers are fair
and reasonable and gives the reasons for forming that opinion. We may
exempt the downstream target from the provisions of s640 if the expert
report is required only because the acquirer became a major shareholder of
the downstream company as a result of the upstream acquisition. In these
cases, the protection of an expert report under s640 is not required. Also, the
pricing of the downstream bid would have been determined in accordance
with our policy.
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RG 71.71 This relief may be inappropriate if material changes to the target company
occur between the date of the expert report and the date for dispatch of the
target’s statement.
RG 71.72 We will not grant this relief where s640 would require an expert report for
any reason other than that the acquirer became a major shareholder of the
downstream company as a result of the upstream acquisition. In these cases,
the acquirer may be assumed to have had access to confidential information
about the downstream company and to have been in a position to control or
influence the actions and responses of both the target boards for the duration
of the offer.
Standstill and voting conditions
RG 71.73 Where our relief is subject to standstill and voting conditions, we will
consider whether the acquirer will obtain absolute or effective control of the
‘upstream entity’ before deciding what types of standstill and voting
conditions will apply.
RG 71.74 Where the acquirer will obtain absolute or effective control of the upstream
entity (e.g. the acquirer will acquire a relevant interest in 80% of the
upstream entity, which holds a relevant interest in 20% of the shares in the
downstream company), our relief will be subject to:
(a) a ‘standstill condition’ that, for a specified period (see RG 71.76), the
acquirer will not acquire, or procure the upstream entity to acquire, a
relevant interest in any more shares in the downstream company; and
(b) a ‘voting condition’ that, for the specified period, the acquirer will not
exercise, control the exercise, or procure the exercise, of any votes
attached to the shares in the downstream company in which it acquired
a relevant interest in as a result of the upstream acquisition.
RG 71.75 Where the acquirer will not obtain absolute or effective control of the
upstream entity (e.g. the acquirer will acquire a relevant interest in 30% of
the upstream entity, which holds a relevant interest in 20% of the shares in
the downstream company), our relief will be subject to:
(a) a standstill condition that, for a specified period (see RG 71.76), the
acquirer will not acquire a relevant interest in any more shares in the
downstream company, other than an increase in the relevant interest
arising because the upstream entity increases its relevant interest in the
downstream company under an exemption in s611, such as item 7 or
item 9; and
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(b) either:
(i) a voting condition that applies to the upstream entity for the
specified period, where the upstream entity supports the
application and agrees to such a condition being imposed; or
(ii) some other type of condition, such as a condition that the acquirer
must not procure the exercise of any votes attached to the
downstream shares it acquired a relevant interest in as a result of
the upstream acquisition during the specified period.
RG 71.76 The specified period will be equivalent to the minimum period of time
within which the applicant could have acquired the same number of voting
shares using the 3% creep exemption in item 9 of s611.
RG 71.77 The purpose of standstill and voting conditions is to protect the interests of
downstream company shareholders in circumstances where the upstream
acquirer has obtained a relevant interest in more than 20% of the
downstream company. The interests of downstream shareholders are
protected because standstill and voting conditions reduce the control effect
of the downstream acquisition.
RG 71.78 We consider that different types of standstill and voting conditions should
apply depending on whether the acquirer obtains absolute or effective control
of the upstream entity. This is because, where the acquirer obtains absolute or
effective control of the upstream entity, the acquirer is in a position to control
the affairs of the upstream entity, including decisions about acquiring a further
relevant interest in the shares of the downstream company and exercising,
controlling, or procuring the exercise by the upstream entity of, the votes
attached to the shares in the downstream company.
RG 71.79 In contrast, we consider that less restrictive standstill and voting conditions
are appropriate where the acquirer does not obtain absolute or effective
control of the upstream entity. In these cases, we consider that a less
restrictive standstill condition is appropriate because of the impact such a
condition may have on the upstream entity (i.e. in these cases, our relief
should not prevent the upstream entity from relying on exemptions in s611
that would otherwise be available). In addition, we consider that a voting
condition may be of limited benefit because it will be the upstream entity not
the acquirer that will control the power to exercise the votes attached to the
downstream shares.
RG 71.80 In relation to applying a voting condition on the upstream entity, we
acknowledge that this may cause the potential for conflicts of interest to
arise for the directors of the upstream entity. However, we consider that this
condition or an appropriate alternative condition (such as the one discussed
at RG 71.75(b)(ii)) will ensure that the interests of downstream shareholders
are adequately protected.
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RG 71.81 When considering whether to impose standstill and voting conditions on our
relief, we will consider all the relevant circumstances, including submissions
from the upstream entity. We will also consider the impact of the conditions
on the downstream company, including their impact on the distribution of
voting power in the downstream company. We will take into account the aim
of protecting the interests of downstream holders by reducing the effect of
the upstream acquisition on control of the downstream company and the
effect of our relief on the upstream entity. When granting relief, we aim to
reduce the risk that our relief is abused by seeking to ensure that an acquirer
is not permitted to act in a manner contrary to the basis on which our relief
was granted.
Other conditions that may apply
RG 71.82 We may consider that the conditions discussed above are not appropriate in
the circumstances of a particular application. We may also consider that,
given the particular circumstances of a proposed downstream acquisition,
other conditions should apply to our relief in addition to standstill, voting or
downstream bid conditions. We may apply other conditions to our relief on a
case-by-case basis.
Sell-down condition
RG 71.83 One type of condition we may consider applying as an alternative to a
downstream bid condition is a sell-down condition. We expect that we will
grant relief subject to a sell-down condition in limited circumstances.
Note: When considering whether to impose a sell-down condition, we may consult with
affected third parties such as the downstream company and substantial shareholders of
the downstream company.
RG 71.84 Where our relief is subject to a sell-down condition, the condition will require
the acquirer to sell down its interest in the downstream company within a
specified time (and if this is not achieved, the acquirer or a subsidiary will be
required to make a downstream bid consistent with the policy in this guide).
RG 71.85 If the acquirer is required to sell down its interest in the downstream
company, our condition will normally state that the acquirer must:
(a) appoint a broker to reduce the acquirer’s voting power in the
downstream company to 20% or less within 14 days of acquiring
control of the upstream entity (or otherwise acquiring the power to
control the disposal of the downstream shares);
(b) not exercise, or procure the exercise of, any voting rights attached to the
downstream shares in excess of 20% without our consent; and
(c) in selling any downstream shares acquired under the relief, ensure that
the broker appointed uses its best endeavours to obtain as wide a
placement as practicable, for the highest practicable price.
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E Applying for relief
Key points
This section sets out the process for applying for relief from s606 in relation
to a downstream acquisition that does not satisfy the exemption in item 14.
How to apply for relief
RG 71.86 We have discretionary power to grant relief from the requirements of Ch 6 in
the form of an exemption from specified provisions, or a declaration that
varies or modifies specified provisions as they apply to a person: see s655A.
RG 71.87 Downstream acquisitions generally involve complex transactions and issues.
Applicants should ensure that there will be sufficient time for us to consider
an application for individual downstream acquisition relief. Applications
should normally be lodged no later than 28 days before the relevant upstream
acquisition is to be made. Additional time should be allowed for applications
that are outside the scope of our existing policy.
RG 71.88 Applicants seeking relief should approach us before the upstream acquisition
takes place. We do not generally have power to grant retrospective relief.
This means that we are unlikely to grant relief to allow a downstream
acquisition if a breach of s606 has already occurred. Applicants should also
refer to RG 51 before deciding on a course of action or timetable for any
acquisition.
RG 71.89 Applicants should submit their applications for relief through the ASIC
Regulatory Portal. They will need to pay fees for an application. We have
provided details about payment options in the portal. For more information,
see how you apply for relief.
Information applicants should provide
RG 71.90 When applying for relief, applicants should refer to Section C and Section D
of this guide and provide full particulars of the proposed upstream and
downstream acquisitions (including the timing, extent and price of the
proposed acquisitions) and drafts of the relevant upstream acquisition
transaction documents.
RG 71.91 An applicant should also provide particulars of:
(a) its voting power in the downstream company at the date of its
application; and
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(b) all acquisitions and disposals, by the applicant and any associate, of
securities in the downstream company and in the upstream entity in the
four months before the date of its application.
RG 71.92 To assist us in determining whether control over the downstream shares is
a significant purpose of the upstream acquisition, applicants must provide
us with:
(a) a clear breakdown of the assets of the upstream target with absolute and
percentage values for the major items and for the downstream shares;
(b) information as to the intrinsic value of the assets of the upstream target
to the acquirer other than the downstream shares; and
(c) a list of the top 20 shareholders of the downstream company, and any
associations between them and the applicant.
RG 71.93 An application should clearly explain the regulatory regime under which
the upstream acquisition will take place. The application should especially
explain:
(a) the disclosure regime; and
(b) the nature of any provisions equivalent to the principles in s602 and
provisions equivalent to s621 and 623.
Procedural fairness
RG 71.94 In some circumstances, we will consider that we are required to consult with
the downstream company, the shareholders of the downstream company or
other potentially adversely affected third parties: see RG 51, in particular RG
51.86–RG 51.87.
RG 71.95 The directors of the target company will normally be assumed to be suitable
representatives of the interests of the downstream shareholders. However,
this may not be the case where:
(a) the acquirer of the upstream entity has been a substantial shareholder of
the upstream target and the upstream target has been in a position to
control or influence the composition of the board of the downstream
company;
(b) the acquirer has been in a position to control the downstream board in
any other way; or
(c) there is evidence or we have been made aware of a dispute between
shareholders and the board of the company about the management and
corporate governance of the company.
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Approving a foreign exchange
RG 71.96 We have approved a list of foreign markets for the purposes of item 14: see
ASIC Instrument 2026/104 and ASIC Instrument 2017/669.
Note: In ASIC Instrument 2026/104, ‘approved foreign market’ has the same meaning
as in ASIC Instrument 2017/669.
RG 71.97 In approving the list of foreign markets included in ASIC Instrument
2017/669, we took into account the criteria set out in RG 72 at RG 72.59,
because the extension of the item 14 exemption to foreign financial markets
that meet these criteria satisfies the policy behind the exemption in item 14:
see RG 71.17.
RG 71.98 A foreign body conducting a financial market may apply to us for approval
for the purposes of item 14. A foreign body corporate may also apply, but
the assistance of the foreign body conducting the financial market is highly
desirable. An application to approve a new foreign financial market will be a
new policy application: see RG 51 for guidance on making new policy
applications.
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